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Abstract 
 
The study on the “influence of research on the competitiveness of the security industry 
in EU and the US” was carried out during a EU fellowship in Washington, DC’s George 
Mason University. The fellow has shared her time between the George Mason University 
and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This study was prepared 
in collaboration with NIST. The analysis has shown that research can influence the 
security industry by enhancing collaboration, by improving availability of experimental 
capabilities and by accelerating standardisation. 
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Executive Summary 
 
The study has three parts. The first discusses the EU and US research programs in 
general and tries to draw similarities and differences. The second looks in more detail at 
the security research programs and again tries to draw similarities and differences as 
well as make some recommendations for improvement. The third part looks into CBRN 
(chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) research. It is also divided in three parts: 
General aims of CBRN research in the EU and the US, the procurement process as a 
driver for development and innovation, and a current look at standards.  
 
The main conclusions are: 
 
 The EU’s research program is managed centrally, it is fully competitive and mostly 
collaborative (consortia with 3 partners and more) with all partners being 
contractually committed. Full visibility to all projects is granted through public 
websites and databases. The US research (non-defense) is managed by each 
department separately, great amounts of the research budget cover the expenses of 
the various national labs. Almost all departments have such labs. The rest of the 
budget goes to grants and project contracts. Evaluation mechanisms are not fully 
transparent for all departments. Collaboration with other stakeholders is 
increasingly required but contracts are often awarded to a single entity. Deliverables 
from projects and grants are not always given sufficient visibility by the 
departments. 
 The main bulk of basic research in the US is managed by DOD for defense, NIH for 
medical and NSF for all other disciplines. However, all departments may award 
grants or contracts for basic research. In Europe it is managed by European Research 
Council (ERC). The US National Science Foundation (NSF), the US National Institutes 
of Health (NIH) and the EU ERC use evaluation by external experts and maintain 
public databases of funded projects and their achievements. There is limited 
exchange between the EU and the US Institutions in basic research. 
 US National labs are instrumental for the advancement of science and  the 
development of technologies and methodologies. In the EU experimental work is 
promoted by the European Research Infrastructure (ERIC) mechanism, which 
however remains limited to only a few subjects. In some fields such as security there 
is little overview of Europe’s experimental capabilities. Experimental capabilities are 
crucial for the testing and evaluation of ideas, technologies and in the end products. 
 Security research is structured very similar in both EU and US. However, the US 
research for homeland security benefits also from the huge defense research 
budget, since developments there spill over to homeland security applications. 
Defense research is closely coupled with procurement minimizing the risk to the 
defense industry. This mechanism is adopted also by DHS for applications such as 
aviation security (Transportation Security Administration). The EU lacks a 
procurement mechanism coupled with research development.  
 DHS has leveraged the capabilities of NIST to boost standardization in security.  
NIST’s testing and metrology labs have developed testing protocols and 
recommendations for technology use that have been instrumental to the 
standardization process. EU’s projects may develop such protocols and 
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recommendations, but such efforts are currently scattered and usually lost after the 
end of the project. DG HOME’s ERNCIP project aims at developing security pre-
norms, but the project’s small budget allows it to cover only a small fraction of the 
needed work. 
 Utilities in both EU and US have been slow to absorb new security technologies. In 
many cases they are not aware of state-of-the-art technology, they lack trained 
security personnel, and agreed-upon procedures for working with authorities to 
resolve CBRN equipment alarms. 
 CBRN technology development in the US is fully under the research-procurement 
mechanism. Huge amounts of money have gone to the pharmaceutical industry to 
develop vaccines and antitoxins for the national vaccine stockpile. However, 
progress has been slow and disappointing. There is hardly any activity of this type at 
EU level. Development of biological detectors has been slow and decontamination 
capabilities are disappointing. Innovation has been lagging behind. A reason could be 
DOD’s procurement model adopted also for the vaccines - and most CBRNE 
technologies - does not motivate the industry to take higher risk in what could be 
game-changing technology solutions.  
 Standardisation plays a major role in industrial competitiveness. The presence of 
NIST in the US, and a more flexible US standardization process, have supported the 
development of security standards and some testing and evaluation procedures for 
security technologies (http://www.nist.gov/national-security-standards/tops.cfm ). 
In Europe this is not happening.  
 
Recommendations are:  
 
The US would benefit from more collaborative research in which small business, 
academia and organisations are involved with the same contractual obligations as big 
business in the form of a consortium. Moreover, transparency in the way departments 
spend their research budgets would contribute towards policies that are more widely 
accepted and shared. 
 
The EU would benefit from a coupling of research and public procurement for security 
technologies. Such technologies could be followed from the idea to the production and 
installation, through a transparent and peer-reviewed process.  
 
Readily accessible experimental capabilities are key to technological development. This 
must include standards and testing and evaluation (T&E) protocols. The EU has to step 
up its experimental capabilities, create better networks of laboratories and more 
funding to develop EU wide test and evaluation procedures for security technologies.  
 
The standardization process in the EU has to be accelerated and complemented with 
pre-norms, guidelines and recommendations based on industry needs and expert 
advice. A great amount of consensus documents are produced throughout EU’s research 
projects and they mostly disappear after the projects’ conclusions. The EU’s single 
market would benefit from a structured repository of pre-norms, guidelines and 
recommendations for industry and their customers both in the public and private 
sectors. 
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The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) could be in charge of 
establishing the framework, the rules, and the quality control of such a repository for 
the EU. 
 
 
  
    7 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 3 
Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... 4 
Abbreviation List ........................................................................................................................ 9 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 10 
EU Research Programme ......................................................................................................... 11 
The Framework Programmes .............................................................................................. 11 
US Federal Research Program ................................................................................................. 12 
The Departments ................................................................................................................. 13 
Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................................................ 13 
Basic Research.......................................................................................................................... 15 
Conclusions and Recommendations ........................................................................................ 16 
Security Research ..................................................................................................................... 17 
EU’s Security Research Program .......................................................................................... 18 
Security of Citizens ........................................................................................................... 19 
Security of Infrastructures and Utilities ........................................................................... 19 
Intelligent Surveillance and Border Security .................................................................... 19 
Restoring Security and Safety in case of Crisis ................................................................. 19 
Security Systems, Integration, Interconnectivity and Interoperability ............................ 20 
Security and Society ......................................................................................................... 20 
Security Research Coordination and Practice .................................................................. 20 
EURATOM Program .............................................................................................................. 20 
DG Home’s Grants Program ................................................................................................. 20 
DHS’s Science & Technology Program ................................................................................. 21 
Borders and Maritime Security ........................................................................................ 22 
Chemical and Biological Defense ..................................................................................... 22 
Cyber Security................................................................................................................... 22 
Explosives ......................................................................................................................... 22 
Resilient Systems .............................................................................................................. 23 
Nuclear Security in the US ................................................................................................... 23 
Comparison of Security Research ........................................................................................ 23 
The Future in Security Research .......................................................................................... 25 
Conclusions and Recommendations .................................................................................... 25 
Case Study CBRN Research ...................................................................................................... 27 
US CBRN Policies .................................................................................................................. 27 
    8 
 
DOD’s Technology Acquisition Model ................................................................................. 29 
Differences with Horizon 2020 ............................................................................................ 30 
EU CBRN Policies .................................................................................................................. 30 
EU’s Research on CBRN-E .................................................................................................... 31 
Security Standards ............................................................................................................... 32 
Recommendations and Conclusions .................................................................................... 35 
Conclusions and Future Work .................................................................................................. 35 
 
 
  
    9 
 
Abbreviation List 
 
AAAS   American Association for the Advancement of Science 
ANSI   American National Standards Institute 
ASTM   American Society for Testing and Materials 
BARDA  Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority 
CBRN   Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear 
CBRNE  Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear and Explosive 
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Introduction 
 
This report is the result of an analysis carried out throughout an EU fellowship in 
Washington DC and in close collaboration with NIST (National Institute for Standards 
and Technology). The scope of the study is to analyse the security research programs in 
both EU and US with the aim to understand how each promotes the competitiveness of 
the security industry. Sharing of good practices and recommendations for future 
improvements are the intended outcomes of the study.  
 
The area of freedom, security and justice is of special concern in the EU. However, in 
this sector the EU has shared competence with the Member States (Treaty of 
functioning of the European Union article 4). The ever-growing pressure on the policy 
makers to protect the citizens from any kind of adversity being natural, accidental or 
intended, such as terrorism, is dictating a concerted approach to the subject. However, 
interests are strong and the maturity and will to act diverge strongly from Member 
State to Member State making any common political approach from difficult to 
impossible. This political dissonance has long-reaching repercussions. There is a lack of 
uniformity in the degree of protection and crisis management competencies around the 
EU, which creates a sense of insecurity and mistrust among the citizens. Another 
problem is the lack of a common EU market for the security industry to direct their 
products and solutions. As a result this EU industry sector remains atrophic, pray to 
industries from other countries, and oriented towards non-EU markets, notably the US, 
in order to be stimulated and become innovative. The security research program was 
established with the 5th Framework program and has been growing since then. Its main 
focus is to bring EU’s researchers active in the field of security closer, enable dialogue 
and stimulate common research. More and more it concentrates its efforts in the 
development of new products, solutions and methodologies. However, it is not clear if 
that translates into market strength, given the lack of market demand at the EU level. 
 
On the other hand, in the US there were already commercial technologies for security 
applications that date back to the 1990’s and earlier in select areas such as biometrics 
products, computer security, communications technologies, and protective equipment  
for fire fighters and law enforcement officers. There were, however, very few 
performance standards for detectors for weapons of mass destruction, for examples 
standards for chemical, biological, radiological/nuclear and explosives (CBRNE). The US 
industry in this sector often worked directly with the US Department of Defense (DOD) 
to develop equipment to meet military requirements. Following the events of 
September 2001, the terrorists’ attacks in New York and the anthrax letters mailed from 
New Jersey, there was a large, concerted effort by the US government and US industry to 
develop products and services to mitigate terrorists’ threats. The terrorists’ threats 
continue, but in the last decade the US has faced additional threats from natural 
disasters (two major hurricanes) and the emerging cyber threat to critical 
infrastructure and institutions. These have accelerated US federal investments and 
industry efforts. An additional factor of major importance is the rise of multinational 
security firms that often split their manufacturing sites between the US and EU. In the 
US, we may see “green” instruments designed for military applications on the shelf with 
“yellow” versions for non-military applications. And, these instruments may display 
results in one set of units for the EU market and yet another for the US market. 
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In the following chapters we shall see the research programs in detail and will try to 
come up with useful recommendations for future action. 
EU Research Programme 
EU Research consists of the Research Framework Programs of the European Union and 
the Research Programs of the 28 Member States. 2014 was the last year of the 7th 
Framework Program and the beginning of Horizon 2020. In the past, some of the EU’s 
Directorates General (DGs) maintained their own research budgets, but that has been 
completely abolished in Horizon 2020.  
The Framework Programmes 
The budget share of framework programmes to EU’s total budget in Table 1 shows a 
steady increase of the importance of research and innovation in the EU. Security 
research was a separate title only in the 7th framework program, whilst it was part of 
the Policy support title in the 6th framework  programme. EU’s framework programs are 
managed centrally by the European Commission’s DG RTD (Research and Innovation 
Directorate General) according to rules laid down by regulation (EU) No 1291/2013.  
Other DGs such as CONNECT for the ICT part, ENER for the energy part, ENTR for space 
and security, etc. are also involved in the management. Similarly, the evaluation of the 
proposals is carried out by independent experts according to rules laid down in 
regulation.  
 
 FP5         (1998-
2002) 
FP6         (2003-
2007) 
FP7         (2007-
2013) 
Horizon 2020 
(2014-2020) 
Budget € 14.96 billion € 17.5 billion € 53.2 billion € 80 billion 
% EU budget ~4 ~3.9 ~6 ~8% 
Security  Under policy 
support line 
1 400 million 1 700 million 
Projects have to have partnerships of at least 3 partners from 3 different Member 
States. Usually projects have to show a fairly good and relevant partnership across 
Europe in order to be approved. Partners all receive a separate contract from the 
Commission and, therefore, are treated equally, and all have a say in the project’s 
decision making.  International collaboration is a plus. Often collaboration is requested 
not only among scientists from various countries but also vertically, i.e., from various 
stakeholder groups from multiple EU Member States. Overall, most applicants in FP7 
come from academia. Second largest come from the various European research 
organisations, and only one third are from the private sector including SMEs (Small 
Medium Enterprises) [Sixth FP7 Monitoring Report]. However, in specific sectors such 
as Energy and Security, private sector and mostly industry are the biggest participants 
and beneficiaries of the program ranging on average of 60% of the participation rate 
and half of the budget available for that field. In fields like the environment, industry’s 
participation rate falls as low as 19%. [source: Ex-post evaluation FP7 “Environment”, 
DG RTD 2014]. Industry receives only up to 50% community contribution, whilst SMEs 
up to 75%.  
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The research topics and calls for expression of interest can be found in: 
http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/ . EU’s research does not include 
defense research. In general Horizon 2020 has three big titles for funds distribution: 
 
Societal 
Challenges 
Excellent 
Science 
Industrial 
Leadership 
Other Total 
29.7 billion 24.4 billion 17 billion 7.5 billion 78.6 billion 
 
Within societal challenges the funding goes to Health (7.5 billion), Intelligent Transport 
(6.3 billion), Energy (5.9 billion) and food, agriculture, water and bioeconomy (3.8 
billion). Space (1.7 billion) is under the industrial leadership title. Excellent science 
encompasses various aspects of basic research. 
US Federal Research Program  
Taken out of the AAAS database, the US budget for research and development shows a 
drop although a small one over the last 5 years. It’s mainly the defense budget that 
bears the loss. 
 
Research Budget 
billion $ 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Defense 92.7 87.2  81.1   70.8   70.5  
Non-Defense 67.2 64.1  65.7  62.6    65   
Total 159.9 151.3  146.8  133.5  135.5  
% total federal 
budget 
4.1 4.0  3.9  3.8 3.4 
 
Research appropriations are distributed to the various US Departments. The figure 
below shows the R&D breakdown to the major Departments for 2011.  
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The situation hasn’t changed significantly since then. This figure also shows the 
breakdown in basic research, applied research and development (advanced technology 
development in DOD). From the picture it becomes clear that US R&D federal funding is 
largely spent for the development of major military system. This explains why industry 
receives up to 70% of these funds annually, with the academia second with 13.9%. 
[source: Matt Hourihan, Federal R&D in FY 2015Budget: An Introduction, 
AAAS].Concerning non-defense, basic research counts for almost half of the funds. Basic 
research is mainly carried out under the auspices of the National Science Foundation 
(NSF) and the National Institute of Health (NIH). 
 
The Departments 
US departments administer their allocated research appropriation fairly autonomously. 
Usually departments have their own science directorates and scientific laboratories that 
serve the department’s priorities and in some cases regulatory provisions. Therefore, a 
great deal of the research appropriations goes to the salaries of the people working 
there. It is not clear, except for NIH, what amount of these funds is allocated to 
extramural work (grants, contracts and other awards). Grants are administered by the 
science directorates of the respective department. Grants are distributed for services 
such as: 
 
Grants to individuals for carrying out research (mainly universities) 
Centers of excellence 
System development and testing 
Standards and methods development - often in coordination with the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
SBIR Program (Small Business Innovation Research) 
 
The second largest beneficiary of the research funds after DOD is the Department of 
Health and Human Services, in which NIH belongs. NIH spends about 80% of its budget 
on grants, contracts and other awards [source: John F. Sargent Jr, Federal Research and 
Development Funding: FY2013, CRS Report, 7-570]  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The two research programs, EU and US Federal, have been compared as far as possible 
from information available in the public domain. The two programs exhibit important 
differences and some commonalities that are highlighted in this section. 
 The EU program is administered centrally by the European Commission DG RTD and 
according to regulation (EU) No 1291/2013. All instruments and provisions for 
funding as well as the evaluation mechanisms are established in that regulation. The 
publication of all calls for expression of interest are through one portal: 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/desktop/en/opportunities/h2020/i
ndex.html 
 The US program is administered by each department separately, with oversight 
provided by both the executive branch and a network of appropriations committees 
in the legislative branch. 
 The EU funds as shown in the table cover almost exclusively grants to EU’s scientists 
and other stakeholders taking part in EU projects, whilst only 2% of Horizon 2020 
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goes to JRC (Joint Research Centre) covering also civil servant salaries. The US funds 
as shown on the table cover salaries of the people working in the science 
directorates of the various departments, the specific research labs and institutes as 
well as grants. With exception of NSF and NIH, it is difficult to know the exact 
amount allocated to grants and contracts. 
 The EU program mainly funds collaborative research projects, with all partners 
treated equally by the sponsor. The mechanism of collaborative research has served 
well new EU policies and regulations, since it tends to encourage sharing and to 
promote consensus.  
Only some US contracts have requirements for collaborative research.  Those that 
do require it still have one contractor and don’t give contracts to the partners. 
However, in Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) proposals and in some other 
instances, collaboration may be necessary to win a grant or contract. 
 The EU programme is fully competitive. The EU engages external experts to peer 
review and evaluate proposals for Research Funds. The criteria and scoring system 
are published in: 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/h2020/grants_manual/pse/h20
20-guide-pse_en.pdf 
Only NSF and NIH apply open and transparent peer review evaluation of the 
proposals submitted to their calls. The other departments may or not apply peer 
review depending on the departments’ science directorate capabilities.  
 All EU funded projects are required to have a dedicated website and a description in 
the publicly available CORDIS database 
(http://cordis.europa.eu/projects/home_it.html ). The Commission does not claim 
ownership of the results and is not an intermediary for the research undertaken. 
Interested parties have to contact directly the project coordinator in order to 
receive more information. A drawback of this is that often results disappear after 
the termination of the project. 
In the US grant results are published in the Departments’ web sites often without 
reference to the scientist who undertook the research. Questions should be 
addressed to the department officer in charge of the research topic. NSF maintains a 
database with summaries and publications of all its awarded projects: 
http://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/. The DOE also has a database of peer-reviewed 
publications originating from its grants and projects: http://www.osti.gov/pages/ 
However, not all the various departments maintain such databases. 
 In the EU program, the largest beneficiary seems to be academia with almost 50% 
allocation of the budget in FP7. In the US, the biggest beneficiary seems to be the 
industry mainly through DOD’s major system development program. However, 
other departments such as DOE and DHS fund system development and testing for 
department needs through their RDT&E appropriations. This is not the case for the 
EU, where the term research for pre-commercial procurement was introduced only 
in Horizon 2020. 
 Both programs, EU and US are subject to only limited high-level evaluation, and 
there are no studies on how and to what extent the programs impact the economy, 
society, national and international markets and academia. 
 
On the basis of the above analysis some obvious recommendations are: 
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 The US would benefit from more collaborative research in which a variety of 
stakeholders are involved in a single project, all partners contractually committed, 
along with the scientists. This would contribute to reducing the divide between 
regulator and industry or regulator and citizen interest groups.  
 The US departments’ research would benefit from more transparency in the 
distribution of the grants.  
 The EU would benefit from more research funds directed towards advanced system 
development for products and services for future regulatory requirements. This 
would create new market niches for innovative products.  
 Both programs would benefit from developing built-in mechanisms for impact 
assessment.  
Basic Research 
EU’s Horizon 2020 has entrusted the European Research Council (ERC) to manage its 
basic research program. Most of the basic research in the USA is coordinated by NSF in 
basic science and the NIH for medical science. These organisations are structured 
similarly and have similar goals.  
 
Scientific excellence appears as NSF’s core value, whilst “transform the frontiers of 
Science and Engineering” is one of the goals of the organization. Another core value of 
NSF is accountability for public benefit, which sort of matches the competitive funding 
requirement encompassed in ERC’s mission. While NSF divides the applications into 
specific scientific fields with prioritised interests, ERC encourages applications on all 
fields with the only distinction being the character of work, i.e. starting, advanced, 
consolidation, synergy research or proof of concept research. Applications are invited 
from all nationalities as long as the host organization is in the EU (source: 
http://erc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/document/file/ERC_Work_Programme_2015.p
df ) . The vast majority of non-EU researchers applying for the funds are US residents. 
NSF funds, in its international exchange program, US researchers in the beginning of 
their careers to work together with ERC grantees (source: 
http://erc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/document/file/agreement_EC_NSF.pdf ).  
 
 
 
The ERC's mission is to encourage the highest quality research in Europe 
through competitive funding and to support investigator-driven frontier 
research across all fields, on the basis of scientific excellence 
 
The NSF mission is to promote the progress of science; to advance the national 
health, prosperity, and welfare; to secure the national defense; and for other 
purposes. 
 
The NIH mission is to seek fundamental knowledge about the nature and 
behavior of living systems and the application of that knowledge to enhance 
health, lengthen life, and reduce illness and disability 
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 Funding Body Budget 2014 Industry participation 
EU ERC €1.7 B (17% of H2020 2014-20) Limited 
US NIH (~50% of $ 30.15 B) Limited 
US NSF $ 7.2 B  (24% of all federal basic 
research) 
In Engineering Research 
Centers 
US DOD $2.2 B Yes 
US DOE – BES $ 1.8 B Limited 
 Source: http://erc.europa.eu/facts-and-figures       http://www.nsf.gov/about/ 
http://science.energy.gov/~/media/budget/pdf/sc-budget-request-to-congress/fy-
2014/Cong_Budget_2014_Basic_Energy_Sciences.pdf 
 
The Department of Defense (DOD) funds long-term basic research in a wide variety of 
scientific and engineering fields with a goal of exploiting new knowledge to enhance-
and where possible, transform-future capabilities. The grants are awarded on the basis 
of relevance for the Department. [source: Report of the Defense Science Board Task 
Force on Basic Research, January 2012]  
 
The mission of the DOE’s Basic Energy Sciences (BES) program is to support 
fundamental research to understand, predict, and ultimately control matter and energy 
at the electronic, atomic, and molecular levels in order to provide the foundations for 
new energy technologies and to support DOE missions in energy, environment, and 
national security. DOE funds also the majority of US National Laboratories, and has 
dedicated resources to the construction and operation of scientific user facilities 
http://science.energy.gov/bes/suf/ . 
 
NIH has a major program for basic research in the life sciences. Eighty percent of NIH’s 
research budget goes for extramural work and this is mainly in the form of grants. NIH 
has a rigorous peer review system to evaluate proposals. The budget is distributed to 
the 27 NIH Institutes and centers to be coordinated and fund the various studies. Basic 
research cuts through all Institutes, ranging from cancer research, to HIV, neuroscience, 
etc. http://www.nih.gov/icd/ 
Conclusions and Recommendations  
The basic research programs of the EU and the US are different in nature, size and 
reach.  
 EU’s program is administered centrally by the ERC, whilst the US program is split 
among various organisations with NSF being the most important one for non-
defense, non-medical research and NIH for medical research. 
 ERC’s program is not structured according to scientific disciplines, more it aims to 
support the single scientist to deliver excellent frontier research. Cross-disciplinarity 
is however one of the criteria on which the proposals are evaluated. Researchers 
appreciate this extra degree of freedom and many non-Europeans move to Europe in 
order to benefit from these grants.  
 Some US department such as DOD, DOE, Health & Human Services (HHS) (to which 
NIH belongs), etc. have strong basic research programs that serve the mission needs 
of the departments. 
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 The US departments also fund the construction and maintenance of experimental 
facilities to support research needs. Through the construction of these facilities the 
departments commit to long-term funding of related projects. Such commitment is 
missing in the ERC Program. However, Horizon 2020(2014-2020) funds the European 
Research Infrastructure Program (ERIC) with €2.5 B.  The term ‘research 
infrastructures’ refers to facilities, resources and related services used by the 
scientific community to conduct top-level research in their respective fields, ranging 
from social sciences to astronomy, genomics to nanotechnologies  (source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/infrastructures/index_en.cfm?pg=what ). 
 Both the US and EU basic research programs are only partially evaluated and it is not 
clear how the funded research impacts the economy and the society in general.  
 
Both basic research programs in the EU and US would benefit from more collaboration 
in facility use. Experimental facilities are key for hypothesis testing and for prototype 
testing of innovative technologies. Both EU and US host unique facilities, which could 
become more readily accessible to the cross-border scientific community. In some fields 
scientists don’t have an overview of experimental capabilities. A report produced in the 
framework of ERNCIP (European Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection) has 
shown that in Europe there is no overview of European experimental facilities in 
security.  The lack of overview leads to outsourcing of experimental work to US 
facilities, mainly the US national labs [source: C. Pursiainen,P. Gattinesi, European CIP-
related Testing Capabilities: Gaps and Challenges, August 2013].  The development of an 
inventory of facilities with unique capabilities and a common program to using them for 
hypothesis testing would both benefit the researchers and would contribute to alleviate 
facility maintenance costs. 
 
As remarked previously both basic research programs would benefit from development 
of in-built mechanisms for impact assessment.   
Security Research 
As explained previously, security research in the EU is mainly funded in the framework 
programs. However, DG HOME also funded projects with limited research through its 
CIPS (Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other 
Security-related Risks) program for the same period. The following table shows total 
amounts of security research funds available. Sources of information for both EU and US 
are: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/security-and-
safeguarding-liberties/terrorism-and-other-risks/index_en.htm 
http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/security/home_en.html 
Source: http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/migrate/uploads/tbli064.pdf 
 
 Program Budget Number of 
funded 
Projects 
Industry 
Participation 
EU FP7-SECURITY 
Budget  
 
€ 1,4 B 
Period 2007-13 
325  
Demonstration 
Projects  26 
80% 
100% 
EU DG HOME CIPS  € 140 M  129  
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 Period 2007-14   
EU  Horizon 2020  € 1,6 B 
Period 2014-20 
In evolution  
US Homeland Security 
R&D 
~$6.6 B in 2014 
~  $5.5 B in 2012 
 see next table 
 
Homeland Security R&D funding breakdown in million US dollars is given in the 
following table. 
 
 FY 2013 FY 2014 Change % 
Agriculture 77 232 200 
Commerce 164 205 15.3 
Defense  2329 2287 -8 
Energy 87 197 127.5 
DHS 773 1374 185.7 
EPA 42 40 -3.8 
HHS/NIH 1804/1804 1806/1805 1.3/1.3 
NASA 12 12 0 
NSF 396 395 0.1 
Total 5700 6600 18 
 
DOD’s Science and Technology Directorate is the greatest beneficiary of Homeland 
Security R&D funds. The S&T Directorate’s budget breakdown for 2014 is as follows. 
 
 FY2014 Requested (billion $) 2014 Approved 
Basic Research 2.2  
Applied Research 4.6  
Advanced Technology 
Development 
Of which DARPA 
5.1 
 
2.9 
 
Total 11.9 12 
 
The amounts include the salaries of the Directorate’s personnel, grants as well as 
contracts for technology demonstrations and testing. DARPA’s funds are almost 
exclusively salaries for DARPA’s personnel and operating costs of the experimental 
facilities. It is not clear which part of the S&T Directorate’s activities funds are covered 
by the “Homeland Security R&D” funding as opposed to “Defense R&D” funding. The 
source for the above table is in page3.9 of: 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY2014_Bu
dget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf 
 
EU’s Security Research Program 
The objective of FP7’s Security theme was to develop the technologies and 
knowledge for building capabilities needed to ensure the security of citizens from 
threats such as terrorism, natural disasters and crime, while respecting fundamental 
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human rights including privacy; to ensure optimal and concerted use of available and 
evolving technologies to the benefit of civil European security, to stimulate the 
cooperation of providers and users for civil security solutions, improving the 
competitiveness of the European security industry and delivering mission-oriented 
research results to reduce security gaps. 
 
Seven titles of activities were funded under FP7. 
1. Security of citizens: technology solutions for civil protection, including bio-
security and protection against risks arising from crime and terrorist attacks. 
2. Security of infrastructures and utilities: analysing and securing existing and 
future critical/networked infrastructure, systems and services 
3. Intelligent surveillance and border security: technologies and capabilities for 
the effectiveness and efficiency of all systems, equipment, tools and processes 
and rapid identification systems for border control and surveillance 
4. Restoring security and safety in case of crisis: technologies for diverse 
emergency management operations and on issues, such as inter-organisational 
preparation, coordination and communication, distributed architectures and 
human factors 
5. Security systems integration, interconnectivity and interoperability 
6. Security and society: socio-economic research 
7. Security research coordination and structuring 
 
Security of Citizens 
The issues of study were: 
 CBRN Protection 
 Explosives 
 Intelligence Against Terrorism 
 Ordinary Crime And Forensics 
 Organized Crime 
Security of Infrastructures and Utilities 
The issues of study were: 
 Cyber Crime 
 Design, Planning Of Buildings And Urban Areas 
 Energy, Transport, Communication Grids 
 Supply Chain 
 Surveillance 
Intelligent Surveillance and Border Security 
Issues of study were: 
 Sea Borders 
 Land Borders 
 Air Borders 
 Border Checks 
 Intelligent Border Surveillance 
 Restoring Security and Safety in case of Crisis 
Issues are: 
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 Preparedness, prevention, mitigation and planning  
 Response 
 Recovery 
 CBRN Response 
Security Systems, Integration, Interconnectivity and Interoperability 
Topics funded were: 
 Information management 
 Secure Communications 
 Interoperability 
 Standardisation 
Security and Society 
 Citizens, Media and Security 
 Organisational requirement for interoperability of public users  
 Foresight, scenarios and security as evolving concept  
 Security economics  
 Ethics and Justice 
Security Research Coordination and Practice 
 ERA-net (a scheme to promote coordination of research at national and regional 
level in the EU Member States) 
 Small and Medium Enterprises 
 Studies  
 Other Coordination 
EURATOM Program 
In all Framework programs there is a part dedicated to Nuclear Energy. This part is 
called Euratom, and in FP7 received a budget of € 2.751 Billion. The budget breakdown 
was as follows: 
EURATOM (2007-2013) Budget (Million €) 
Fusion Energy Research 1947  
Nuclear Fission and Radiation Protection 287 
Joint Research Centre 517 
 
DG Home’s Grants Program 
The table shows DG HOME’s grants programs and their respective budgets 
 Period 2007-2013 Period 2014-2020 
CIPS (Terrorism Prevention) €140 Million -------- 
ISEC (Fight against Crime) €600 Million -------- 
External Borders €1.8 Billion  
shared management 
-------- 
AMIF (Asylum, Migration and 
Integration Fund) 
€4 Billion €3.137Billion 
ISF (internal Security Fund)- 
Borders & Visa 
 €2.760 Billion / 1 Billion 
direct funding 
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ISF-Police  €1 Billion/342 Million 
direct funding 
 
DG HOME’s grants program has the objective to promote collaboration among Member 
States and raise awareness on security issues. It promoted collaboration among 
authorities, utilities and research organisations or academia. The scope was not 
research for knowledge generation, but more application of research results and 
dissemination of current knowledge and good practice.  All awarded projects under 
CIPS can be found in: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/financing/fundings/security-and-safeguarding-liberties/terrorism-and-other-
risks/index_en.htm and of ISEC under: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/financing/fundings/security-and-safeguarding-liberties/prevention-of-and-
fight-against-crime/index_en.htm 
 
Projects may be funded under direct funding scheme, i.e., managed by DG HOME or 
under the shared management scheme, i.e., managed directly by the Member States. 
When funded under the shared management scheme, there is no information about how 
the funds are distributed.  DG HOME has set up a web site where information on the 
funds that each Member State has received can be viewed:  
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/financing/fundings/mapping-
funds/index_en.htm 
 
Again, all above indicated funds are for grants and contracts only.  
DHS’s Science & Technology Program 
DHS has an in-house scientific capability, the Science and Technology Directorate, 
whose job is to “strengthen America’s security and resiliency by providing knowledge 
products and innovative technology solutions for the Homeland Security Enterprise”. The 
science & technology for the radiological/nuclear threat within DHS is handled by a 
separate group, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. 
 
According to  
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/MGMT/FY%202014%20BIB%20
-%20FINAL%20-508%20Formatted%20(4).pdf the budget breakdown is: 
 
 FY 2014 requested 
(Million $) 
FY 2014 approved 
(Million &) 
Management & Administration 129.6  
Acquisition & Operations Support 41.7  
Laboratory Facilities 857.8  
Research, Development and 
Innovation  
467  
University Programs 31  
Total 1500 1374 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Of.  291.3 
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DHS S&T maintains a system of laboratory facilities, which have unique capabilities for 
specific threats: 
- Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC) Its mission is to identify and assess 
chemical threats and vulnerabilities in the United States and develop the best 
responses to potential chemical hazards. 
- National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) Its mission is to 
defend the nation against biological threats. 
- National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). Its mission will be (proposed lab) to 
study foreign animal, emerging and zoonotic diseases that threaten the US animal 
agriculture and public health.  
- National Urban Security Testing Laboratory (NUSTL) Its mission is to support the 
successful development, evaluation and transition of homeland security 
technologies into field use for law enforcement, fire and other emergency response 
agaencies. 
- Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) Its mission is to work on high-
consequence, live foot-and-mouth disease. 
- Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL). It offers the homeland security community 
the ability to advance detection technology from conception to deployment through 
applied research, test and evaluation, assessment, certification and qualification 
testing. 
 
The DHS S&T HSARPA (Homeland Security Advanced Research Project Agency) is also 
beneficiary of this budget. The work program 2014 of HSARPA included the following: 
Borders and Maritime Security 
o Cargo 
o Land 
o Maritime 
Chemical and Biological Defense 
o Threat Awareness 
o Biosurveillance 
o Detection and Diagnostics 
o Response and Recovery 
Cyber Security 
Explosives 
o Air Cargo 
o Aircraft Vulnerability 
o Canine Detection 
o Checked Baggage 
o Checkpoint 
o Homemade Explosives 
o Mass Transit 
o Standoff Detection 
o Trace Detection 
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Resilient Systems 
o Community Resilience 
o Critical Infrastructure 
o Cyber Physical Systems 
o Decision Support 
o Evaluation Research 
o Security and Identification 
 
Nuclear Security in the US 
The National Nuclear Security Administration is the main organization charged for 
nuclear security in the US. Their budget in 2015 was $11.4 billion.  Their priorities 
include effective stewardship of the nuclear deterrent, controlling and eliminating 
nuclear materials worldwide, advancing navy nuclear propulsion, and strengthening 
key science technology and engineering capabilities (source: 
http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/budget ). 
 
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office in DHS is in charge of implementing domestic 
nuclear detection efforts for a managed and coordinated response to radiological and 
nuclear threats, as well as integration of federal nuclear forensics program (source: 
http://www.dhs.gov/about-domestic-nuclear-detection-office ).  
 
Comparison of Security Research 
 
Since EU’s framework programs are not concerned with either defense or medicine, the 
security part of FP7 (without the Euratom research) can best be compared with DHS’s 
Science and Technology Directorate. 
 
Comparative table EU-FP7and US-DHS Security Research 
EU-FP7-security US-DHS-S&T Comment 
CBRN Protection 
CBRN Response* 
CBRN Threat Awareness 
Biosurveillance 
Detection and Diagnostics 
Response and Recovery 
The DHS program covers 
more aspects. * Under crisis 
management in the EU 
Explosives Explosives Both programs are 
comprehensive 
Intelligence -------- IARPA is in charge of this in 
the USA 
Ordinary Crime 
Organised Crime 
--------- Not under DHS 
Cyber crime Cyber security Cyber security is dealt in 
Europe by DG CONNECT only 
Cybercrime under Security 
Euratom Domestic Nuclear Detection 
Office  
DOE has the National 
Nuclear Security 
Administration 
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Concerning Borders the comparison reveals: 
EU-FP7-security US-DHS-science Comment 
Land Border Land Border  
Sea Border Maritime Border  
Air Border Air-based Technologies* *Under Land Border in the 
US 
Border Checks Checkpoints* *Under Explosives in the US 
Supply Chain* Cargo Security *Under Infrastructure in the 
EU 
Intelligent Surveillance In each HSARPA portfolio Under  Land, Maritime and 
Cargo in the US 
 
Concerning Crisis Management and Resilience the comparison reveals: 
EU-FP7-security US-DHS-science Comment 
Preparedness, prevention, 
mitigation and planning  
Response and Recovery 
Cyber Physical Systems 
Decision Support 
Identification 
Evaluation 
First Responders 
technologies 
 
Energy and Transport grids   Critical Infrastructure The US program goes 
beyond energy and transport 
Design, Planning Of Buildings 
And Urban Areas 
Community Resilience The US program goes 
beyond Buildings and Urban 
areas 
 
Concerning horizontal issues the comparison reveals: 
EU-FP7-security US-DHS-science Comment 
Information management 
Secure communications 
Interoperability 
Standardisation 
Interoperability and 
Compatibility 
System Assessment and 
Validation 
Capability Development 
Capability development 
includes the Standards office 
and the Operational Test and 
Evaluation office 
  
Concerning social & stakeholders issues: 
EU-FP7-security US-DHS-science Comment 
Citizens, Media & Security 
Organisational requirement 
for interoperability of 
public users  
Foresight, scenarios & 
security as evolving 
concept Security economics  
Ethics and Justice 
Communication Office 
Interagency Office 
International Cooperative 
projects office 
Office of Public Private 
Partnerships 
Office of University 
Programs* 
*University Programs are 
about Excellence centres and 
development of Security-
related university curricula 
and training 
 
    25 
 
The EU-FP7-security SME (small medium enterprise) program is comparable to the US-
DHS-science SBIR (small business innovation research) program. 
The Future in Security Research 
 
The strategic goal of DHS S&T’s APEX programs is to look at the nation’s security and 
address future challenges while continuing to support today’s operational needs. 
Priorities of APEX are:  
 APEX Entry/Exit Re-engineering to increase Customs and Border Protection’s 
capacity to screen travelers entering the United States and to confirm the departure 
of non-U.S. citizens from U.S. airports. 
 APEX Next Generation First Responder with the aim to develop a scalable and 
modular ensemble that includes an enhanced duty uniform, personal protective 
equipment, wearable computing and sensing technology, and robust voice and data 
communication networks. 
 APEX Screening at Speed with the aim to create an almost-invisible checkpoint by 
integrating imaging, trace detection, X-ray technologies, and software systems. 
 
In EU’s Horizon 2020, one of the topics in the call “Disaster Resilience: Safeguarding and 
securing society, including adapting to climate change” is about improving the aviation 
security chain: 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/desktop/en/opportunities/h2020/t
opics/1075-drs-16-2014.html . 
Possible areas of research (not exclusive) for this call could be: “alternative screening 
processes and interventions; investigate how, where and when aviation security 
controls shall take place to provide the most effective and efficient results; look at the 
further development of processes' to maximise security outcome and minimise impact 
on industry and passengers; and how compliance and their effectiveness will be 
demonstrated. It should include system level solutions” 
 
Another topic in the same call is about “Communication technologies and 
interoperability topic 2: Next generation emergency services” source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/desktop/en/opportunities/h2020/t
opics/1077-drs-19-2014.html . 
The call asks for “..build a validation-focused programme/framework  using existing 
standards and protocols, with consideration of e.g. call location and routing, video 
calling to assist people with disabilities, security, integration of social media channels 
Next Generation eCall, messaging and early warning systemsetc”. It requires “European 
technology providers, emergency services organisations, research and development 
laboratories, telecommunication network providers, Voice Over IP providers, and 
software providers to build on the expertise in a collaborative fashion”.  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 The two programs look quite similar in terms of objectives, priorities and subjects 
treated. Both programs have a strong technology development angle. Both 
institutions vastly involve the security industry in the development of technology. 
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Whilst FP7 engages the industry and the scientists in the collaborative research 
scheme, DHS provides its own scientists to guide the industrial development.  
 The bottom up approach of EU’s security research serves well to develop a shared 
base of knowledge, to exchange good practice and arrive to consensus. However it 
lacks leadership to capitalize on the above achievements. DHS’s S&T provides 
leadership to develop the technologies and knowledge needed for the “homeland 
security enterprise” but might not always be shared by the economic and social 
stakeholders.  
 DHS S&T gathers the technology requirements of the many DHS operational 
components, such as FEMA, TSA, Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, etc. 
to guide procurement of suitable solutions. S&T goes beyond existing solutions and 
stimulates the industry to develop the next generation products, which then will be 
most probably acquired by future DHS procurements. 
 In the EU, security procurements remain the responsibility of the Member States. 
After developing their products through EU research, companies are left on their 
own to find their way to a fragmented EU public procurement process.  
 Despite the enthusiasm of industry and scientists to develop innovative products, 
often the technology training of authorities, utilities and other service providers is 
low. Utilities show little understanding for the additional costs of innovation in 
security. This is valid for both the EU and US communities. 
 DHS S&T has its own laboratories to obtain advice on the best technology standards 
and state of the art knowledge in security. In the EU the access to labs is limited. 
First because the experimental capabilities of the Member States are not well 
understood and networked, and second because the security topic has only recently 
entered the research framework program. DG HOME’s ERNCIP project has the aim to 
network EU’s experimental facilities to obtain advice and standards (https://erncip-
project.jrc.ec.europa.eu ).   
 DHS S&T has launched its academic program, with the aim to develop proper 
security training and certification for professionals for all economic sectors. Neither 
DG HOME nor Horizon 2020 (FP7’s successor) have set that goal.  
 DHS capitalizes on NIST’s (National Institute of Standards and Technology) extensive 
experimental capabilities and industrial networks to extend its standardization 
program and guide the trading of security solutions in other economic sectors in the 
US and externally. The EU does not have a similar organization to NIST. JRC provides 
some support for measurement standards, but JRC’s mandate in standardization 
remains limited to the urgent needs of policy that require CEN/CENELEC 
intervention. NIST’s mandate is the competitiveness of the US industry by advancing 
standards and measurements. NIST standards experts are not necessarily involved in 
ANSI’s (American National Standards Institute) standardization program, but provide 
a measurements and standards base for ANSI standardization. In the EU, much of 
the work that NIST does would be characterized as  pre-norms, given that the word 
standard is reserved for the formal process of recognized standardization bodies. 
 
Pre-normative work at the EU level should be strengthened. This could be achieved by 
networking EU’s laboratory capabilities and Member States authorities under strong 
leadership, provided by DG HOME. A program of lab funding could support the network 
to use their resources for harmonization of test protocol, certification, reference 
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materials and training as well as benchmarking and research. Once tested equipment 
may be cleared for procurement from all EU Member States. A model procurement of 
security equipment could be developed similar to the one currently used for defense 
under Directive 2009/81/EC on defense and sensitive security procurement 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/rules/defence-
procurement/index_en.htm 
 
The EU should support the development of academic courses and curricula on security 
of critical infrastructures at all levels.  The industry should be involved in developing 
the curricula since they will be the beneficiaries of better security trained staff. Such an 
activity has been taken up by ERNCIP and should strengthened in the future 
https://erncip-project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/networks/academic-committee/63-academic-
committee-news/137-3rd-erncip-academic-committee-meeting-on-20-21-october-
2014-in-ispra  
Case Study CBRN Research 
Scientific research in both EU and US is very much driven by the respective CBRN 
policies. 
US CBRN Policies 
In the US, mainly 4 departments share the CBRN research budget, HHS, DOD, DHS and 
EPA with lesser amounts going to DOJ’s FBI and the USDA. 
  
Programs 2015 Budget ($) 
HHS BioShield and BARDA 415 and 415 million 
DOD Chemical Biological Defense 1.4 billion 
EPA  33.8 million 
DHS S&T 125.426 million.  
 
Source http://www.hhs.gov/budget/fy2015-hhs-budget-in-brief/hhs-budget-in-brief-
phssef.html 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-03/documents/fy15_bib.pdf 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20S%26T%20Research,%20De
velopment,%20Acquisition%20and%20Operations%20Fiscal%20Year%202015%20Congress
ional%20Justification.pdf 
 
HHS is the coordinator of medical countermeasures and the BioShield project, under 
which the national vaccine stockpile is created. At the same time, HHS hosts the agency 
BARDA (Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority), whose role is to 
fund and coordinate research on CB countermeasures. BioShield spent $ 3.3 billion in 
the period between 2003-2013, 90% of which was spent for the development of 
vaccines for Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), smallpox and botulism. In 2015 the US 
Congress has agreed to spending $ 415 million for BioShield and another $ 415 million 
for BARDA. BioShield is a coordinated effort between BARDA, NIH, American 
Pharmaceutical Industry and FDA for: vaccine development, testing, licensing and 
acquisition. Big Pharmaceutical Industry has not been positive about vaccine 
development since they don’t see a market beyond the national stockpile. Moreover, 
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clinical testing is also time consuming and expensive and liabilities are high. In order to 
get some participation at all, the congress had to remove liabilities for the developed 
vaccines from the companies due to limited testing or non-human clinical testing. 
Liabilities to the industry involved in the BioShield project have been removed.  
http://www.hhs.gov/budget/fy2015/fy2015-public-health-social-services-emergency-
budget-justification.pdf 
 
Many contracts have been given to smaller companies, though some failed to either 
develop or produce the countermeasure in the given time limit. Vaccines are considered 
biological products. For such products FDA licenses the products. Issuance of a biologics 
license is a determination that the product, the manufacturing process, and the 
manufacturing facilities meet applicable requirements to ensure the continued safety, 
purity and potency of the product. Since licensing by FDA takes some time, often 
countermeasures have started stockpiling before licensing. According to law, the 
Secretary of Health has the right to authorize the use of countermeasures even without 
licensing in case of crisis.   
 
The DOD similarly develops medical countermeasures for its combat troops. DOD’s 
threat list is different than the national security threat list. DOD does distribute 
provisionally vaccination to soldiers with CBRN at risk missions.  Budget is summarized 
in the sources below, for RDT&E and procurement. 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/budget_just
ification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/4_RDTE_MasterJustificationBook_Chemical_Biological_De
fense_Program_PB_2015_Vol_4.pdf 
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2015/budget_just
ification/pdfs/02_Procurement/PROCUREMENT_MasterJustificationBook_Chemical_an
d_Biological_Defense_Program_PB_2015_1_3.pdf 
 
Moreover DOD’s Chemical Biological Defense program includes the development and 
production of handheld CBRN detection devises, protective cladding and 
decontamination devices for combat troops. A great deal of this research and 
development spills over to homeland security applications.  Biowatch of DHS Office of 
Health Affairs is a project which aims to equip the US transportation sector with bio 
detectors. Biowatch-3 cost $61 million between 2009 and April 2014, when DHS 
cancelled the acquisition. The program failed to produce what it envisioned to become 
“lab-in-a-box”. Nevertheless DHS stays committed to continue efforts in that field. 
Source: 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2014/June/Pages/BioWatch3Ends,
ButNot%E2%80%98Lab-in-a-Box%E2%80%99Goal.aspx 
 
Major contracts to US industry by DOD and DHS have stimulated the development of 
technologies, but these have been slow to be absorbed by homeland security actors 
such as utilities, civil protection and police. The National Strategy for CBRNE Standards 
tried to tackle this problem. DHS, DOD and EPA in collaboration with NIST support 
activities for the development of standards in such technologies in order to make them 
more functional and affordable for users.  
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%20S%26T%20Research,%
20Development,%20Acquisition%20and%20Operations%20Fiscal%20Year%202015
%20Congressional%20Justification.pdf 
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Nevertheless development of both solutions and standards have been slow in the US 
and even slower in the EU. 
DOD’s Technology Acquisition Model 
 
As mentioned previously technology in CBRNE is mostly acquired through DOD’s 
acquisition methods. This model is also followed by DHS but in a much smaller scale.  
DOD also uses a methodology to define technology readiness levels for new system 
development (http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2003systems/nolte2.pdf ) (see picture).   
 
 
A successful technology will be followed the whole way through up to acquisition and 
deployment by DOD . 
 
According to a report from the Congressional research service: “Defence acquisitions: 
how DOD acquires weapon systems and recent efforts to reform the process” by Moshe 
Schwartz, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34026.pdf, DOD’s technology acquisition 
model also includes technology design and development. It is a full cycle starting from 
DOD’s streamlined user requirements to system requirement, design, development, 
testing, production and acquisition. It is a long-term process, sometimes over decades.  
Usually the result is a highly customized solution, whose development and production 
bears no risk for the industry since the sponsor, DOD, will also be the customer. 
However, according to the above mentioned report this method presents many 
difficulties. 
 
Usually there is one main contractor to develop a highly sophisticated solution. The 
contractor may have subcontractors, but the prime contractor is the program executor. 
There are no requirements for consortia building and sharing of work, responsibilities 
and decision making. 
 
The contractor is in constant dialogue with the sponsor and customer, i.e., the DOD. 
However DOD’s input and involvement depends on the capabilities and knowledge of 
the limited federal program officers that will work on the project. Of course DOD has a 
pool of high profile scientists in its ranks to draw from and the process is well 
monitored. Nevertheless, the number of contracts that DoD has is huge and the in-house 
scientific resources are limited.  
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Defense acquisition processes usually require much more money and need much more 
time than originally estimated. This is due to factors including limited in-house 
scientific personnel, but also to the nature of the process. The defense industry has no 
pressure to meet market’s requirements, only DOD’s requirements. By funding such 
large acquisition projects the US government acts as both customer and regulator, 
thereby skewing free market rules. Last but not least, industry has a no risk attitude. 
Companies don’t innovate unless they are engaged in such an acquisition program. This 
is true for big industry that usually receives these contracts. The situation is different 
for small and medium industry (SME or SBIR), who do innovate but face limits on 
bidding on DOD’s huge contracts. The only mechanism DOD has to involvement in the 
acquisition process is through subcontracting of the main contractor. This cuts out 
SBIRs from decision making and visibility.  
Differences with Horizon 2020 
 
HORIZON 2020 also applies Technology Readiness Levels and in each call they are 
clearly mentioned. However it is the consortium that should commit to the technology 
development and not the customer. Often there is no potential customer involved in the 
consortia. Security Technology developed may be never tested, if tested may be never 
applied operationally, if operational may never be acquired. Testing protocols of the 
technology and operational requirements hardly go beyond the project. There are no EU 
wide operational requirements, testing protocols and good practice repositories. 
 
If the technology in the end does find its way to a customer in a EU Member State by no 
means it is launched in the full European Market, due to a lack of a single market for 
security. The technology would have to be approved and re-approved in every single 
Member State before acquisition. The pre-commercial procurement mechanism has 
been launched in order to support this transition but is still to be fire tested. 
EU CBRN Policies 
 
The main policy document on CBRN is the EU’s CBRN action plan.  It’s strategic goal is to 
reduce the CBRN threat in Europe; it consists of 124 actions in order to achieve the goal, 
starting from enhancing security of high-risk material and security to improvement of 
information exchange among Member States and to standards for detection equipment. 
Research at EU level is designed in support of these actions.  
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-and-
terrorism/explosives/docs/20140505_detection_and_mitigation_of_cbrn-
e_risks_at_eu_level_en.pdf 
 
However, some other EU policy documents mention CBRN threats and invoke measures 
to protect the public. These are summarized in the table below. 
 
 
DG Policy Comment 
HOME CBRN Action Plan (2009)  
ECHO Civil Protection Mechanism 
(2001) 
Civil protection exercises on CBRN 
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ENV SEVESO III Directive (2012) On protection of chemical plants 
SANCO Decision on Cross-border threats 
to health (2013) 
Includes joint procurement of medical 
countermeasures 
EEAS Chemical Weapons Convention, 
Biological Weapons Convention 
 
ENER Framework for Nuclear Safety of 
Nuclear Installations (2014) 
Regulated as RN material source 
MOVE Guidelines for Trans-European 
Transport Network (2014) 
CBRN threats are not mentioned, 
however legislator keep an eye on 
them 
GROWTH EU security industrial policy 
(2012) 
Mandate 487 for CBRN-E standards 
 
EU’s Research on CBRN-E 
 
EU’s research budget covers also explosives research. During FP7 (2007-2013) there 
were funded 60 CBRN projects worth 200 million and 15 projects worth 67 million. 
Examples include: 
Acronym Description Budget  # Partners 
SECUR-ED Demo security technologies incl. 
CBRN detection 
40 M 40 
EDEN Demo CBRN Resilience 36 M 37 
CATO CBRN crisis management 14 M 27 
PRACTICE Preparedness and Resilience 
against CBRN terror attack 
12.7 M 26 
The partners from institutions all over Europe include academia, industry, research 
organisations, non-profit organisations, and local and Member State regulatory 
authorities. 
 
Calls with CBRN-E content will continue in Horizon 2020. There has been already an 
open call with the title “Tools for detection, traceability, triage and individual 
monitoring of victims after a mass CBRNE contamination or exposure” which closed in 
28/8/2014. The call asked for “…improved CBRN detection and monitoring 
capabilities…” and that “..existing networks of users (defense/security experts, firemen, 
rescuers) are actively involved…”. Budget preferably between €5-12m. 
 
A call with deadline 27/08/2015 stated “….addressing standardisation opportunities in 
support of increasing disaster resilience…”. This call asks for this research to be carried 
out within the context of policy initiatives such as the CEN/CENELEC/ETSI Mandate 
487 for the development of security standards (CBRNE, Crisis Management and Border 
Security) and in collaboration with CEN/TC 391 and ISO/TC 223.  
 
The Joint Research Centre’s ERNCIP (European Reference Network for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection), which aims at the development of security pre-norms and 
recommendations for Critical Infrastructure Operators and authorities all over Europe, 
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received direct funding from Horizon 2020 over the years 2014-15, for supporting the 
work of the mandate 487 to CEN/CENELEC and ETSI.  
 
JRC also leads the development of the COEs (Centres of Excellence) in CBRN. An effort to 
prepare and transfer knowledge to developing counties on CBRN threats and counter 
measures. 51 countries host such Centres of Excellence today. Many of the Countries 
develop their national CBRN strategies as a result of EU’s COE work.  Source: 
http://www.cbrn-coe.eu 
Security Standards 
 
The US Standards Communities 
 
NIST is a catalyst for US standards. NIST’s mission to promote US innovation and 
industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards and 
technology and its core competences in measurement science standards development 
and use, give it a key position worldwide. Its internationally recognized expertise comes 
from its wide base of laboratories and experimental programs. 
 
NIST supports US agencies to understand and work with advanced technology to 
improve technical requirements of their procurement processes. NIST experts lead 
technical discussions on standardization, support the industry with data and lab work, 
and bring along scientific insights important for the advancement of technologies 
appreciated by both the industry and the public procurer. NIST maintains extensive 
public databases of all sorts of recommendations and guidelines for the proper use and 
testing of technology.  
 
NIST has been working with the other federal agencies, industry stakeholders and 
standards development t organizations to develop standards, test methods and 
conformity assessment systems for CBRN equipment for first responders. The types of 
equipment range from detectors, to protective ensembles and respirators, to sampling 
and decontamination technologies. 
 
The table below summarizes the standards and conformity assessment procedures that 
have been developed for hand-held detectors for CBRN agents.  The situation with 
performance standards is fairly good. However, test methods to show conformity with 
standards still lag behind. In most cases testing is still carried out in specialized DOD 
facilities. 
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Some observations and lessons learned from substantial US investments in CBRN 
standards and conformity assessment are: 
• For chemical and biological agents, detection is critically dependent on how 
the sample is taken. The detection technology may be quite sensitive, but 
the sample must be introduced into the detection volume. 
• The research agenda in related fields can drive the technology 
development. Biotechnology, for example, continues to develop more 
sensitive and specific methods of detection traces of biological agents and 
this technology is directly relevant to detection of biological warfare agents. 
• NIST participation and leadership of the standards writing groups are 
essential to both development of the standards and their buy-in from the 
users. 
• After a decade of use of this class of detectors, there are increasing efforts to 
harmonize standards for CBRN detection systems. As markets continue to 
expand, there is greater acceptance of standards by both federal agencies 
and US industry. 
 
Stakeholders involved in the standardization process acknowledged the importance of 
the contribution of NIST’s laboratory work and expertise. Furthermore NIST gave the 
stakeholders important insights on how to improve both the technology and the 
requirements.  
 
The EU Standards Communities 
 
The EU’s standardization efforts in CBRN haven’t gone very far. Horizon 2020 is a great 
mechanism to produce CBRN technology, but it hardly finds its way to public 
procurement and to standardization.  
 
JRC’s ERNCIP is a completely bottom up and voluntary network for the preparation and 
development of security pre-norms. It is active in the fields of: 
 Chemical Biological threats in Water 
 Explosive detection in sectors other than aviation 
 Radiological and Nuclear threats 
 Structural resistance to explosions 
  
Threat Standard Conformity 
Assessment 
Method 
Chemical ASTM 2885-13 None Ion Mobility 
Spectrometry (IMS) 
Biological AOAC Standard 
Method Performance 
Requirements 
AOAC International 
(Very limited) 
Polymerase Chain 
Reaction (PCR) 
Radiological / 
Nuclear 
IEEE/ANSI N42.34 
and N42.48 
 
DNDO GRaDER 
Neutron Detection 
& 
Gamma-Ray 
Spectrometry 
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In each of these fields, stakeholder groups are convened, led by champion scientists, to 
exchange laboratory good practice and develop pre-norms. Examples of the groups’ 
work are: 
 
 List-mode data acquisition based on digital electronics (EUR 26715). Pulse processing 
digitisers are powerful instruments, important for nuclear security, critical 
infrastructure protection, nuclear physics and radiation metrology. Some critical 
parameters affect their performance in both lab and field. Tests are proposed to 
assess the performance of acquisition systems for these parameters. 
 Protocols for more efficient cooperation between competent authorities and remote 
expert support or reachback centres at the national and international level, for 
radiation measurements and data analysis. 
 Review of methods for the rapid identification of pathogens in water samples. 
 
More details can be found in https://erncip-project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/download-
area/viewcategory/8-thematic-groups 
 
Some of these pre-norms can be taken up by Technical Committee 391 of 
CEN/CENELEC  to become EU standards. This process will require another 3-5 years. In 
the meantime industry that wants   to develop products as well as public authorities 
that need to procure products may use ERNCIP’s pre-norms. The European single 
market sorely needs such pre-norms to operate properly for all possible technology 
solutions and even more so for security technologies such as CBRN. Other Research 
Framework Projects would have developed such pre-norms, if there were a possibility 
to file them in a common repository, where they could be accessed by interested 
parties. JRC could play a role in collecting and maintaining a systematic repository of 
approved pre-norms and recommendations for public procurement. 
 
The International Security Standards 
The international standards for CBRN countermeasures most recognized are those 
produced by the International Organisation for Standards (ISO) and the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).  The ISO and IEC technical committees, 
subcommittees and working groups sometimes develop standards, but often use as a 
starting point a national standard submitted by a member from the US or an EU 
Member State, as well as contributions from other member nations. 
 
CBRN technologies have evolved rapidly over the past two decades and the 
measurements and standards infrastructures differ markedly for different technologies. 
The ISO in 2014 established a new umbrella Technical Committee (TC 292) to collect 
different ISO TC activities that focus on security standards. The international members 
of this TC represent important stakeholder communities in the US and EU for standards 
in emergency preparedness and resilience. This activity could in future include 
standards for operational response to CBRN incidents.  
 
Performance standards for specific technologies, on the other hand, are often developed 
by IEC technical committees. A good example is the standards for radiological/nuclear 
detectors and x-ray scanning systems developed under IEC TC 45. 
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There are other important standards for security technologies developed by US 
domiciled standards development organisations that have international including EU 
members as active participants. These include, for examples, ASTM International 
(chemical, biological and explosives), AOAC International (microbiological).  ASTM and 
AOAC standards are sometimes, but not always, submitted to ISO for consideration as 
international standards. 
Recommendations and Conclusions 
 
US CBRN technology development would benefit from a higher participation of small 
and innovative companies, to stimulate competition within the industry and better 
products with less cost.  
 
The EU’s security and CBRN single market would benefit from a mechanism for 
identifying pre-norm activities underway in both communities. And, for some common 
repositories for cataloging the pre-norms and subsequent standards for the security 
technologies. Horizon 2020 and JRC could be part of this mechanism. Possible models 
include security standards databases prepared by the US American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI) and the International Organisation for Standards (ISO). 
 
http://www.hssd.us/ 
 
http://www.iso.org/sites/sags/ 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
The EU and US research influence on industrial competitiveness has been analysed at 
high level. Important differences have been pointed out in the operation of the budget 
distribution. These differences become more important in the field of security and 
CBRN in particular. The collaborative scheme of EU’s research favors pluralism and 
small business but it lacks committed customers. On the other hand standardization and 
testing and evaluation is more successful in the US through a well-funded laboratory 
network, NIST and a faster standardization routine in comparison to the EU. Future 
work should look in more detail on how to further exploit collaborative research for the 
purpose of technology acquisition and how to boost EU’s standardization and testing 
and evaluation mechanism to better serve the single market’s needs. A central 
repository of best practice, technical guidelines and testing protocols as produced by 
EU’s Horizon 2020, would be a cornerstone for the single market and the EU industry. 
JRC could be the host of such a repository. 
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How to obtain EU publications 
 
Our publications are available from EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu), 
where you can place an order with the sales agent of your choice. 
 
The Publications Office has a worldwide network of sales agents. 
You can obtain their contact details by sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758. 
 
 
 
 
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union 
Free phone number (*): 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 
(*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers or these calls may be billed. 
 
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. 
It can be accessed through the Europa server http://europa.eu 
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JRC Mission 
 
As the Commission’s  
in-house science service,  
the Joint Research Centre’s  
mission is to provide EU  
policies with independent,  
evidence-based scientific  
and technical support  
throughout the whole  
policy cycle. 
 
Working in close  
cooperation with policy  
Directorates-General,  
the JRC addresses key  
societal challenges while  
stimulating innovation  
through developing  
new methods, tools  
and standards, and sharing  
its know-how with  
the Member States,  
the scientific community  
and international partners. 
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